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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20040360-SC

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) grants the Utah Supreme Court
jurisdiction over this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The district court erred in ruling that the Division of Finance's

administrative rule providing a retainer to cover costs of counsel and reasonable litigation
expenses conflicts with the governing statute.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Drake
v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999
UT 36,1 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203; Taylor ex rel. C. T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f 6,977
P.2d479,480.

2.

It is reasonable and rational for the Division of Finance to provide, by

administrative rule, procedures for the time and manner of making payments to cover
costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses as required by the governing statute.
An agency's interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is
empowered to administer must be rational and is set aside only if it is imposed arbitrarily
or capriciously or is beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Associated General
Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,ffif18-19, 38 P.3d 291;
Williams v. Public Service Comm 'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988).
3.

The district court erred in ordering the Division of Finance to pay for

transcripts that petitioner failed to have transcribed and included as part of the record in
his petition for Rule 60(b) relief, and for transcripts that are irrelevant to claims he wishes
to pursue on appeal.
The interpretation of statutes and rules is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Rushton v.
Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ^ 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203; Taylor ex rel CT v. Johnson,
1999 UT 35, t 6, 977 P.2d 479, 480.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The full text of the following determinative statute and administrative rule
pertinent to the issues before the Court is attached as Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004)
Utah Administrative Code R. 25-14-1 to 6 (2002)
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal stems from a May 10, 2004, district court ruling that portion of an
administrative rule promulgated by the Division of Finance (the "Division") is
inconsistent with the governing statute. (R. 3904-3909). Although Menzies's
("petitioner") case has a long history, most of its proceedings are irrelevant to this appeal
In short, on March 8, 1988, a jury convicted petitioner of capital murder and kidnapping
in the death of Maurine Hunsaker. See generally State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 396
(Utah 1994) cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Judge Raymond Uno sentenced
petitioner to death. Id. After the Utah Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction,
he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief. (R. 1-37).
Ultimately, the district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, dismissed
petitioner's petition, and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. (R. 2237-63;
2399-2400). Petitioner has appealed the dismissal of his petition. (R. 3913-14)
On February 9, 2004, petitioner moved the trial court to order the "State of Utah"
to pay for a the deposition transcript of Edward Brass, petitioner's prior legal counsel.
(R. 3659-60). Later, petitioner moved to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for his appeal
and to require the "Government" to pay for transcripts, printing, and costs for appeal. (R.
3790-91).
Judge Pat Brian granted petitioner's motions to pay for the Ed Brass deposition
transcript, to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for appeal, and to require the
"Government" to pay for transcripts, printing, and costs for appeal. (R. 3904-09). The
3

court ruled that the Division's administrative rule providing payment of a retainer to
cover both costs of counsel and litigation expenses is inconsistent with the governing
statute. (R. 3908-09.) Judge Brian signed a final order consistent with his memorandum
decision on May 10, 2004. (R. 3927-29).
The Division filed a notice of appeal on April 26, 2004. (R. 3919-21). Petitioner
filed a notice of cross-appeal, and requested preparation of over 30 transcripts and
"designation of records." (R. 3917-18; 3924-26). The Division responded and objected
to petitioner's transcript request. (R. 3935-40). The Division argued that most of the
requested transcripts were irrelevant to this appeal and were excessive given the issue on
appeal. (R. 3935-40). Petitioner moved to strike the Division's Response and Objection.
(R. 3941-42).
Prior to ruling on petitioner's motion to strike, the Utah Supreme Court considered
and ruled upon the State's motion to strike petitioner's designation of record in the related
post-conviction appeal (Case No. 20040289-SC). (Addendum "B"). The Supreme Court
denied the State's motion in part and granted it in part and ruled that "[t]he State shall be
required to provide a transcript for each hearing described by affidavit to be submitted by
[petitioner's] counsel to the district court." Id. The affidavit was required to specify the
manner in which each hearing was referenced during the Rule 60(b) proceedings and its
relevance to those proceedings. Id. Based on this ruling, Judge Brian, in this case,
ordered petitioner's counsel to file an affidavit as detailed and ordered by the Utah

4

Supreme Court, and to file an amended request for transcripts and designation of record.
(R. 3995-98). Although petitioner did file the affidavit as ordered by the Supreme Court
in the post-conviction case, she has not filed an affidavit nor amended request for
transcripts and designation of record in this case.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004) (the "statute") provides that in postconviction appeals of death penalty cases the "[cjosts of counsel and other reasonable
litigation expenses incurred . . . shall be paid from state funds by the Division according
to rules established" pursuant to the Utah Rulemaking Act. Accordingly, the rule
promulgated by the Division provides that all legal counsel agree to accept for "legal
services performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of
Payments of Attorneys Fees

" Utah Admin Code R. 25-14-3 (2002) (the

"administrative rule" or "rule"). The Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees provides
payment of set amounts upon the happening of certain events, such as appointment of
counsel by a district court, and timely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief Utah
Admin. Code R. 24-14-4 (2002). In addition, the rule provides separate and additional
payment for "reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000.00 in any one
case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants." Utah Admin.
Code R. 25-14-3 (2002).
Shortly after the district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief and
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a Motion to Require
5

Government to Pay for Transcripts, Printing, and Cost for Appeal and a Motion to
Appoint Rule 8 Qualified Counsel for Appeal. (R. 3990-91). Even though the Division
had paid petitioner all the required amounts for "the legal services performed and
litigation costs incurred,'1 petitioner argued that he was entitled to additional and separate
payment of ordinary, routine legal costs under the rule's $20,000 allotment for
investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants. (R. 3792-3799).
The Division filed a memorandum opposing petitioner's motions. (R. 3830-35).
The Division argued that according to the plain language of the rule and its harmony with
the statute, petitioner agreed to accept the payments already made as full compensation
for both the costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses. (R. 3830-35). Since
petitioner did not request payment for expenses of court approved investigators, expert
witnesses, or consultants, the Division argued, he was not entitled to any additional
payment. (R. 3830-35).
Nevertheless, Judge Brian granted petitioner's motions and ordered the Division to
pay for all transcripts, printing, and costs that the petitioner deems necessary to perform
the post conviction appeal separately from, and in addition to, the legal fees and other
payments the Division already made to petitioner. (R. 3904-09). Judge Brian concluded
that the "rule fails to separate 'costs of counsel' from 'otherreasonable litigation
expenses,'" and, therefore, the rule "is too narrowly written to represent the statute." (R.
3908). Judge Brian also concluded that the Division was required to pay for any

6

transcript petitioner deemed necessary for his appeal. (R. 3909).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in three respects. First, the trial court erred in ruling that
the Division's administrative rule conflicts with the governing statute. The statute
expressly requires payment of "costs of counsel" and "reasonable litigation expenses,"
but does not require separate payment of those expenses. The administrative rule
provides separate sets of payments for: (1) expenses for legal services performed and
litigation costs incurred; and (2) expenses, up to a total of $20,000 in any one case, for
court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants. The rule is consistent
with the statute because it does not abridge, enlarge, or extend the statutory provisions.
Rather, it only provides the procedures for paying the required statutory expenses.
Petitioner agreed to accept the payments made for both legal fees and litigation costs.
Because petitioner is not asking for payment of investigators, expert witnesses, or
consultants, he is not entitled to any additional payments.
Second, the court failed to afford the Division's application and interpretation of
the rule any deference. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the "Act") expressly
empowers the Division to administer its provisions. Accordingly, the Division's
interpretations of the operative provisions of the Act must be rationally based and should
be set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, or are beyond the
tolerable limits of reason. It is reasonable and rational for the Division to provide
directions for the time and manner of payments to cover the statutorily enumerated
7

expenses. The statute describes what expenses are to be paid from state funds, while the
rule describes the procedure for making payment to cover those expenses. The Division's
decision to pay both costs of counsel and litigation costs through a single set of payments
is not arbitrary or capricious, and is not beyond the tolerable limits of reason.
Finally, the district court erred in allowing petitioner's legal counsel carte blanche
to order any transcript, regardless of its relevancy, and in requiring the Division to pay for
irrelevant transcripts. If required to pay for litigation expenses separately and in addition
to costs of counsel, the Division should be required to only pay for transcripts that are
relevant to and part of the Rule 60(b) appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RULE CONFLICTS
WITH THE STATUTE.
Menzies ("petitioner") has collaterally attacked his conviction of kidnapping and

aggravated murder by filing a petition for post-conviction relief A petition for postconviction relief is a civil matter. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Defendants pursuing postconviction appeals are not constitutionally entitled to legal counsel. Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Treffv, Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, 26 P3d 212. Nonetheless, in
post-conviction appeals the Utah Legislature has provided for both the appointment and
payment of legal counsel for indigent defendants in capital post-conviction proceedings:

Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in
providing representation [in post-conviction petitions] shall be paid from

8

state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules established
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c) (West 2004) (the "statute").
To meet the statute's mandate, the Division of Finance (the "Division")
promulgated Utah Administrative Code Sections R. 25-14-1 through 6 (the "rule" or
"administrative rule"). Absent extraordinary circumstances, the rule provides for two
separate sets of payments to cover costs of counsel and litigation expenses. The first set
of payments covers "legal services performed and litigation costs incurred." Utah
Admin. Code R.25-14-3 (2002) (providing that "all appointed counsel agree to accept as
full compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred, the
amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section R2514-4").l The second set of payments covers "reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed
a total of $20,000 in any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and
consultants." Utah Admin. Code R. 25-14-5 (2002) (emphasis added).
Although petitioner has received all amounts for which he qualifies, he argues that
the rule cannot be read literally to include payment for ordinary litigation expenses within
the first set of payments.2 He argues instead that ordinary litigation expenses such a copy

1

The Schedule of Payments provides $5,000 upon appointment by the district
court, $5,000 upon timely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief, $10,000 after
completion of discovery, $5,000 for evidentiary hearings, and $7,500 upon the filing of a
brief and remittur.
2

Importantly, petitioner does not challenge the rule's payment amounts and caps in
this appeal. Nonetheless, any issue of the rule's payment caps is not properly before the
9

and deposition transcript costs should be paid from the second set of payments, even
though these costs admittedly are not of investigators, expert witnesses, or consultants.
Even though petitioner never argued that the rule conflicts with the statute, the trial court
ruled that the rule conflicts with the statute because "it fails to separate 'costs of counsel'
from "other reasonable litigation expenses/" The court ordered the Division to pay
petitioner's printing, copy, and deposition transcript costs from the second set of
payments. This ruling is in error because the rule is entirely consistent with the statute.
A.

The rule's express language is entirely consistent with the statute's
requirement that costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses for
indigent defendants convicted of capital crimes be paid from state funds.

It is well-established that "an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing
statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm V?, 846 P.2d
1304, 1306 (Utah 1997); see also West Jordan v. Dep't of Employment Security, 656 P.2d
411,412 (Utah 1982); SF Phosphates Limited Co. v. Auditing Div., 912 P.2d384, 385
(Utah 1998); Crossroads Plaza Ass 'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 1197, 965 (Utah 1996). A rule
that is "in conflict with the express provisions of a statute would in effect amend that
statute." Id. A rule is invalid only "when [it] nullify[s] or waive[s] the provisions of
statutory law." Id.; see also Draughon v. Department of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT
App 42, 975 P.2d 935 (holding that a rule is inconsistent with a statute only if it abridges,

Court because petitioner has not petitioned to amend the current rule as required by
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (West 2004). Moreover, petitioner has not
exhausted his administrative remedies on this issue.
10

enlarges, extends, or modifies the statute). A rule, therefore, is consistent with the statute
and must be applied as written if it does not '"confer greater rights or disabilities' than the
governing statute." Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc., 2001 UT 57, f 10; 29 P.3d 629, 631
(quoting SF Phosphates, 972 P.2d at 386). A rule carries a presumption of validity when
determining whether the rule is consistent with governing statutes. South Central Utah
Tel Ass'n, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 951 P.2d 218, 223 (Utah 1997); Newspaper Agency
Corp. v. Department of Workforce Services, 1999 UT App 222,1f 12, 984 P.2d 399, 402.
In interpreting a statute to determining whether a rule is consistent with its
provisions, a court first looks to the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature.
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^ 7; 31 P.3d 528, 529; Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (holding that "when language
is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left
for construction"). Generally, "rules made in the exercise of a power delegated by the
statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if possible, an effectual
piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason." Crossroads
Plaza, 912 P.2d at 965; Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 7 (ruling that a rule should be read in
harmony with the governing statute so that the rule is acceptable); McKnight v. State Land
Board, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963) (ruling that "[rjules made in the exercise of a
power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound
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reason").
In the analogous case of Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Department of Workforce
Services, 1999 UT App 222, 984 P.2d 393, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the
Department of Workforce Service's administrative rule authorizing appellate filings at
various employment centers was consistent with the governing statute. The
administrative rule was consistent with the statute because it "describes who must receive
the appeal, while the rule describes a procedure for how this may be accomplished."
Id. at \ 13. The court determined it was reasonable and rational for the Department in its
administrative rule to "flesh out direction for the time, place, and manner of filing an
appeal." Id. at \ 14. The Department's rule was entirely consistent with the statute, the
court concluded, because it "simply effectuate[s], and thus do[es] not contradict, the
statutory goal of providing notice of an intent to appeal to the Division of Adjudication."
Id. at f 14; see also SF Phosphates, 972 P.2d at 386 (concluding that a Tax Commission
rule defining the term "mining" was consistent with the governing statute and rejecting a
the argument that the mining must have one definition for all tax-related purposes and
must be defined broadly); Morgan County v. Holnam, 2001 UT 57, 29 P.3d 629
(concluding that Tax Commission's rule defining "new and expanding operations" to
include an increase in plant production or capacity consistent with the governing statute).
In contrast, the Utah Court of Appeals in Fussell v. Department of Commerce, 815
P.2d 250, 254 (Utah Ct App. 1991), ruled that the Department's rule imposing licensing

12

requirements on psychologists was inconsistent with the governing statute because it
"imposes additional requirements for psychologist licensure that are not contained within
the plain meaning of the statutory language/' Specifically,"[r]ather than administering
the former statutory requirement for psychologists through clarifying regulations, the
Division effectively amended it, by creating stricter educational requirements than the
statute contemplated." Id.; see also Airport Hilton Ventures, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax
Comm 7i, 1999 UT 26, 976 P.2d 1197 (concluding that the Tax Commission exceeded its
power to assess sales and transient room tax as authorized by the governing statute by
promulgating a rule that added other criteria to the statute determining taxability).
The rule in this case is entirely consistent with the express language of the statute.
Construing the statute and rule in harmony, the statute enumerates what expenses are
covered, while the rule provides procedures for how those expenses are paid. The statute
simply requires the payment of "[cjosts of counsel and other reasonable litigation
expenses." Similar to the statute in Newspaper Agency Corp., the statute is silent on the
time, manner, and amount of payments to cover costs of counsel and litigation expenses.
The rule therefore provides prescribes the time, manner, and amount of payment.
The rule pays for "legal services performed and litigation costs incurred," from one set of
payments, and "reasonable litigation expenses . . . for court approved investigators,
expert witnesses, and consultants" from a second, separate set of payments. The rule pays
a set amount for legal services performed and litigation costs incurred upon the happening

13

of certain, objective events, such as $5,000 upon appointment of counsel, $5,000 upon
proof of timely filing of a petition, and $ 10,000 after all discovery is completed. Payment
of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants, on the other hand, is paid upon court
approval and is capped at $20,000. In contrast to Fussell, the rule does not impose
additional or stricter requirements than the statute. Rather, it simply provides procedures
to carry out the statutory mandate. Accordingly, the rule is entirely consistent with the
statute.
B.

The administrative rule is consistent with the statute even if it contains nonsubstantive differences in wording.

A rule is not invalid simply because it contains some minor differences in wording
from the controlling statute. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the notion that minor
wording differences from a statute invalidate a rule. See Layton City v. Glines, 616 P.2d
588 (Utah 1980). In Glines, the court rejected an argument that a city ordinance
penalizing persons driving while intoxicated contained an invalid inconsistency because
the city failed to amend the ordinance consistent with amendments made to the
controlling state regulation. 616 P.2d at 588. The ordinance differed from the state
regulation only in the absence of any provision dealing with subsequent conviction for
driving while intoxicated and the penalties prescribed for injuries inflicted while
operating a vehicle in a proscribed manner. Id. at 598. Although the court acknowledged
differences between the state regulation and ordinance, it concluded that those differences
did not amount to an "invalidating inconsistency." Id. The court pointed out that "'[i]n
14

determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether
the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice
versa.'" Id. {quoting Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1938)). The
ordinance was valid even though it did not encompass all the proscriptions of the state
regulation because it did not permit or forbid anything beyond the statute. Glines, 616
P.2d at 588; see also Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(concluding no invalidating inconsistency between a city DUI ordinance and state statute
and ruling that a "municipal ordinance need not be identical to the controlling state statute
to be consistent with it").
The rule in this case uses key terms of art and concepts that are not only
synonymous with, but are virtually identical to those used in the statute. The statute
requires payment of "costs of counsel" and "reasonable litigation expenses." The rule
provides payment for "legal services performed and litigation costs incurred." Both the
statute and rule, through the first set of payments, provide payment of legal fees and
ordinary litigation costs such as the printing, copy, and deposition costs. Just as in Glines,
the rule and statute are in complete harmony because, even though the language is slightly
different, the rule does not permit or forbid payment of any expense not expressly
enumerated by the statute. Rather, both the rule and statute provide payment for legal
fees and routine litigation expenses. In short, the rule and statute are consistent regardless
of minor differences in terminology between the rule and statute.

15

C,

Not only is the rule consistent with the language of the statute, it is also
consistent with the intent of the statute.

In addition to being consistent with the express language of the statute, the rule is
also entirely consistent with the intent of the statute. The statute's intent simply is not
undercut by the rule's current payment provisions.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act's (the "Act") intent is to "establish a
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies . . . ." Utah Code Ann, §
78-35a-102 (West 2004). To help accomplish the Act's intent, the statute provides for the
appointment and payment of legal counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases.
Rather than direct the manner in which payments are made or the amount of expenses
covered, the Legislature expressly directed the Division to promulgate rules to administer
payment of the enumerated expenses.
Consistent with the Legislature's direction, the rule's express intent is to "establish
the procedures and maximum compensation amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses by the Division of Finance." Utah Admin. Code R, 25-14-1(2) (2002),
Accordingly, the rule describes the manner in which payment for expenses will be made
and in what amounts; it does not, however, enumerate what expenses will and will not be
paid.
The rule also acts in concert with the statute to accomplish several public policy
goals. First, the rule places responsible limits on the expenses of individual defendants
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while at the same time serving the greater public interest by providing taxpayer funding
for post conviction proceedings.
Second, the rule allows for quick, effective, and consistent administration. The
rule provides payment of legal fees and ordinary litigation expenses on the happening of
specific, objective events. Legal counsel need only provide proof of the event. Only the
extraordinary expenses of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants requires court
approval. This payment mechanism allows legal counsel the discretion to most
effectively use the funds provided. Legal counsel know, up front, the amounts available,
when those amounts will be paid, what expenses will be covered, and what is required for
payment.
Finally, the rule effectively removes the Division from any decision-making on the
merits of a particular expense. The rule allows assigned legal counsel to make decisions
on costs and expenses without the oversight of a government agency. By providing
procedures for payment, the rule simply helps carry out the statutory intent, and it is
consistent with the statutory goal of providing funds for effective representation of
indigent defendants convicted of capital crimes.
II.

THE DIVISION'S RULE AND DECISION TO PAY COSTS OF COUNSEL
TOGETHER WITH REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES IS
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL.
The standard of review applied to an agency's interpretations of the operative

provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer is an arbitrary and capricious
standard. Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Minings 2001 UT 112,
17

% 17; 38 P.3d 291, 297 (emphasis added); SF Phosphates Limited Co. v. Auditing Div.,
972 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1998) (ruling that an agency's interpretation of its own rules are
reviewed for reasonableness). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,
agency interpretations must be rationally based and are set aside only if they are arbitrary
and capricious or beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Associated. Gen. Contractors,
2001 UT 112, ^J 17. An agency's interpretation of the statutory law it is empowered to
administer is
limited to situations where the agency has been granted explicit or implicit
discretion under the statute, where the agency possesses expertise
concerning the operative provisions at issue, or where the agency is
otherwise in a better position than the court to assess the law due to its
experience with the relevant subject matter.
Id.
The statute at issue here is the prototypical example of an explicit grant of
discretion to an agency. The statute expressly provides that "costs of counsel and
reasonable litigation expenses . . . shall be paid from State funds by the Division of
Finance according to rules established pursuant to [the] Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c) (West 2004). Not only does the statute
explicitly grant the Division the discretion to promulgate rules, the Division possesses the
expertise to administer the statute's payment provisions. Indeed, the Division's core
responsibility and expertise is to control, account for, and pay state funds. The Division
not only routinely pays expenses incurred by indigent defendants convicted of capital
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crimes, but also from similar funds it administers, such as the Indigent Defense Fund. See
e.g. Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ^ 19 (concluding that it was within the
State Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining's expertise to define terms by rule using geological
rather than economic terminology). Because of the statute's explicit grant of authority,
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is the correct standard to apply in
interpreting and applying the rule. See Id.
When interpreting an administrative rule, courts use standard rules of statutory
construction. McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963); Brendle v.
City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Rules made in the exercise
of a power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound
reason." McKnight, 381 P.2d at 73 L
In the analogous case of Associated General Contractors, the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that an administrative rule promulgated by the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining that
defined terms using geological rather than economic terminology was valid because it
was consistent with the controlling statute. 2001 UT 112, \ 26. It was rational and
reasonable, the court concluded, for the Board to use geological terminology to define key
terms because, in part, the governing statute itself used geological terminology to define
terms and the administrative rule simply followed the definitional framework established
by the governing act itself. Id. at ^f 26. The court also applied an arbitrary and capricious
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standard of review because the governing statute expressly allowed the Board to enact
rules necessary to carry out the purpose of the governing statute. Id. at \ 19.
Similarly, in Newspaper Agency Corp., the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that "[i]t
was reasonable and rational for the Department [of Workforce Services] to flesh out
directions for the time, place, and manner of filing an appeal." 1999 UT App 222, f 14.
Therefore, the rule was entirely consistent with the governing statute because it
"prescribed the permitted methods for filing an appeal with the Division" whereas the
statute described who must receive the appeal. Id.
Associated General Contractors and Newspaper Agency Corp. command the same
result in this case. The rule could not be more clear: "all appointed counsel agree to
accept as full compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred
the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section
R25-14-4." Utah Admin. Code R. 25-14-3 (2002) (emphasis added). It is not only
reasonable and rational for the Division to supply directions that provide the time and
manner for paying expenses, it is required by the statute itself. Petitioner's argument that
he is entitled to separate, additional payments to cover ordinary litigation expenses from
the funds set aside for expert witnesses, consultants, and investigators simply is not
supported by the plain language of the rule.
The Division interprets and applies its rule as providing payment of costs of
counsel and ordinary litigation expenses such as printing, copying, and transcript costs
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together from the first set of payments. This interpretation and application is reasonable
and rational and the rule should be applied as written to petitioner.
Nonetheless, the reasons for the rule's payment structure and mechanism are many,
but all provide a reasonable and rational basis for the rule. First, the payment of a set
amount to cover both legal fees and litigation expenses allows legal counsel for indigent
petitioners to control and direct those funds, rather than burdening both legal counsel and
the Division with the need to submit each and every bill of various expenses for payment.
Legal counsel is thereby placed in the preferred position of deciding how to best use the
allotted funds.
Second, because the Division is not involved in the merits of virtually ail postconviction proceedings, payments of ordinary expenses are triggered upon the happening
of objective events. The rule generally does not require any qualitative assessment by the
Division of particular expenses, but only requires a signed request for payment verifying
the happening of the event.
For extraordinary expenses of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants that
may require some qualitative assessments, the rule requires court approval.3 The rule
thereby allows assigned legal counsel to make decisions regarding specific expenses
without the oversight of a government agency that has no context of the underlying

3

Payment of ordinary expenses from the funds reserved for investigators, expert
witnesses, and consultants, would require court approval, whereas under the correct
interpretation of the rule, those ordinary expenses do not.
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proceedings. It also eases administration of the statute's payment provisions, and
provides consistency and objectivity.4 Just as in Associated General Contractors and
Newspaper Agency Corp., the Division's decision to provide one set of payments to cover
both costs of counsel and ordinary litigation expenses is reasonable and rational.5
III.

THE DIVISION IS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY FOR IRRELEVANT COSTS,
INCLUDING COPYING COSTS OF IRRELEVANT TRANSCRIPTS, IF
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL SUMS FOR PRINTING
AND OTHER COSTS
In ruling that petitioner is entitled to additional payments for litigation expenses,

the district court ruled that it "is not here to step in the shoes of Petitioner's counsel."
Thus, the court allowed petitioner to "choose to use [the $20,000 available for
investigators, consultants, and expert witnesses] on post-conviction appeal expenses as
she deems necessary to perform her duty as counsel." Under the current rule, however,
the payments provided allow legal counsel wide discretion to use the funds allotted and
does not require the Division or a court to step into the shoes of legal counsel.

4

Petitioner's interpretation, on the other hand, would create redundancy, and
would effectively provide an additional, unforseen avenue for payment of litigation
expenses. Under petitioner's interpretation, legal counsel would be entitled to payments
for costs of counsel and litigation expenses from the first set of payments, payment for
expert witnesses and consultants from the second set of payments, and separate,
additional payments for litigation expenses also from the second set of payments.
5

Had the Division meant that ordinary litigation expenses be paid from the set of
funds reserved for investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants, it would have used
exemplary language rather than exclusive, limiting language. The rule does not use the
nonexclusive terms "for example" or "such as." The rule specifically enumerates
payments for investigators, experts witnesses, and consultants only.
22

Nonetheless, should the Division be required to pay petitioner additional amounts
for litigation expenses from the second set of payments, it should only be obligated to pay
for those transcripts properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion proceedings. In any
appeal, the record consists of "[t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the
transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the
docket sheet." Utah Rule App. P. 11(a). Petitioner may only appeal the trial court's
denial of rule 60(b) relief. Accordingly, petitioner may only designate the transcripts
from the rule 60(b) proceedings for his post-conviction appeal. As this Court has
previously ruled in the related post-conviction appeal, if the Division is required to pay
additional sums for copies of transcripts, it is only obligated to pay for those transcripts
properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion proceedings. (Appendix "B"). The Division
should be under no obligation to pay for transcripts that are irrelevant to the rule 60(b)
motion proceedings and that were not properly referenced in those proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should vacate the trial court's order and remand
for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2

day of December, 2004.

JOEL A. FERRE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM "A"

78-35a-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases.
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has
been affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing
scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the death warrant, of the provisions
of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.
(2) (a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine
whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record regarding the
defendants indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly
appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as
required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record
by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the
rejection.
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in providing the
representation provided for in this section shall be paid from state funds by the Division
of Finance according to rules established pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.

R25-14-L Authority and Purpose.
(1) This rule is implemented pursuant to Section 78-35a-202.
(2) The purpose of the rule is to establish the procedures and maximum compensation
amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and litigation expenses by the Division of Finance to
legal counsel appointed by district courts to represent indigent persons sentenced to death
who request representation to file an action under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act.
R25-14-2, Request for Payment
In order to obtain payment for attorney's fees and litigation expenses, counsel appointed
by a district court, pursuant to Section 78-35a-202(2)(c), shall present to the Division of
Finance a certified copy of the district court order of appointment of legal counsel and a
signed Request for Payment verifying the work has been performed as provided in
Section R25-14-4 pursuant to the schedule of payments set forth in that section.
R25-14-3. Scope of Services.
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment to represent an indigent
client sentenced to death and by presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of
Finance, agree to provide ail reasonable and necessary post-conviction legal services for
the client, including timely filing an action under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 35a,
Post-Conviction Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings
conducted thereafter including, if requested by the client, an appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court.
(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation for the legal services
performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments
of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4.
R25-14-4. Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees.
All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client shall be paid, in the aggregate,
according to the following schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of
Finance that the specified legal service was performed or the specified events have
occurred:
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and presentation of a signed
Request for Payment to the Division of Finance.
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction relief.
(3) $10,000.00 after all discovery has been completed, all prehearing motions have been
ruled upon, and a date for an evidentiary hearing has been set.
(4) If an evidentiary hearing is required, $5,000.00 on the date the first witness is sworn.
(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the district court. $5,000.00 of the
total shall be paid when the brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00
when the Utah Supreme Court finally remits the case to the district court.
(6) An additional fee of $100 per hour, but in no event to exceed $5,000.00 in the
aggregate, shall be paid if:
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration;

and
(b) the district court finds:
(I) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal services that were not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of accepting the appointment, such as responding to or
filing a petition for interlocutory appeal, and
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation of the client's
claims.
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the district court and compliance
with the provisions of this rule.
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses.
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of
$20,000.00 in any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and
consultants. Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed counsel must
submit a request for payment to the Division of Finance including:
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is requested; and
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the expenses were both reasonable
and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims.
R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel.
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section 78-35a-202 is permitted to withdraw by the
court or, due to death or disability, is unable to continue, the attorney shall be paid only
for the actual work performed to the date of withdrawal as certified by the court.
(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's improper conduct or the
court finds that a foreseeable conflict of interest which should have been disclosed prior
to appointment existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be repaid to the
Division of Finance.

ADDENDUM "B"

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUN 3 0 20W
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FILED
W E S T VALLEY DEPT
-00O00--

JUL - 7 2004
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Time

Ralph Leroy Menzies,
Appellant,

Case No. 20040289-SC
Hank Galetka, Utah State
Prison Warden,
Appellee.

ORDER
Before the Court is Appellee's motion to strike Appellant's
designation of record. The motion is denied in part and granted
in part. The State shall be required to provide a transcript for
each hearing described by affidavit to be submitted by
Appellant's counsel to the district court. The affidavit shall
specify the manner in which each hearing was referenced during
the rule 60(b) proceedings and its relevance to those
proceedings. For purposes of plenary review of the denial of the
rule 60(b) motion, this court will only consider those record
materials properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion
proceedings. In the event this Court finds that a transcript was
not referenced during the rule 60'b) proceedings, but Appellant's
counsel nevertheless required its production pursuant to
affidavit, Appellant shall be required to reimburse the State for
the costs of procuring the transcript. Appellant's motion for
costs and attorney fees is denied.

FOR THE COURT;

L'^>o~oH
Date

latthew B
Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on June 30, 2004, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
ELIZABETH HUNT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1018 E MILLBERT AVE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106
ERIN RILEY
THOMAS BRUNKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY
ATTN: KAREN EELLS
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119
Dated this June 30, 2004.
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Case No. 20040289
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY, 030106629

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

RULING AND ORDER

Petitioner,
vs

Case No 030106629

HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison
Judge PAT B BRIAN
Respondent

The above post conviction case comes before the Court for decision on Ralph Leroy
Menzies' ("Petitioner" or "Appellant") Petitioner's motion to strike the Division of Finance ("the
Division") response and objection to Petitioner's request for transcripts and designation of record
and the Division's opposition to Petitioner's motion to strike

BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2004, the Court granted Petitioner's motion for the Division to pay for
transcripts, printing and other costs of appeal, as deemed necessary by Petitioner's counsel On
April 26, 2004, the Division filed an appeal challenging the Court's decision On May 4, 2004,
Petitioner filed a notice of cross-appeal On May 11, 2004, Petitioner filed his request for
transcripts and designation of record On May 18, 2004, the Division filed it response and
objection to Petitioner's request On May 20, 2004, Petitioner filed her opposition and motion to
strike On May 28, 2004, the Division filed its opposition to Petitioner's motion to strike The
parties did not request oral argument

On June 30, 2004 the Utah Supreme Court issued an Order granting in part and denying
m part the State of Utah's motion to strike Petitioner's designation of record The Court stated in
relevant part
The State shall be required to provide a transcript for each hearing described by
affidavit to be submitted by Appellant's counsel to the district court The
affidavit shall specify the manner in which each hearing was referenced during the
rule 60(b) proceedings and its relevance to those proceedings For purposes of
plenary review of the denial of the rule 60(b) motion, this court will only consider
those record materials properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion proceedings
In the event this Court finds that a transcript was not referenced during the rule
60(b) proceedings, but Appellant's counsel nevertheless required its production
pursuant affidavit, Appellant shall be required to reimburse the State for the costs
of procunng the transcript
ANALYSIS
Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's order and the Division's memoranda, along with
other documents in this case, it appears that Petitioner's motion to require the Division to pay for
all thirty-three (33) transcripts, given the narrow issue on appeal may be excessive However, in
a Rule 60(b) motion the final step m the analysis is whether there is a meritorious claim Here,
the motion for summary judgment that Petitioner tried to set aside by his Rule 60(b) motion,
relates to one claim, whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel at Petitioner's trial and
direct appeals If the final prong of the Rule 60(b) motion is addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court, then the thirty-three (33) transcripts may be relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner's
remaining claim has merit Nevertheless, as stated by this Court before, "The Court is not here to
step in the shoes of Petitioner's counsel" The Utah Supreme Court has ordered Petitioner's
counsel to file an affidavit specifying what hearings were referenced in the Rule 60(b)
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proceedings and the relevance of those hearings in the Rule 60(b) proceedings and Petitioner's
counsel may request transcripts accordingly
Based upon the discussion above, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion to strike.
ORDER
The Court ORDERS Petitioner's counsel to file an affidavit as detailed and ordered by
the Utah Supreme Court and an amended request for transcripts and designation of record .
DATED this J £ _ day of
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By the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 030106629 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

NAME
THOMAS B BRUNKER
ATTORNEY RES
160 EAST 300 SOUTH #600
P.O. BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84114-0000
JOEL A FERRE
ATTORNEY RES
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH, 5TH
FLOOR
P.O. BOX 140857
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84114-0857
ELIZABETH HUNT
ATTORNEY PET
3194 S 1100 E STE 202
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106

2c.

2

day of
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^

Deputy Couft Clerk

Paae 1 (last)
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ADDENDUM "C"

[N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

RALPH LEROY MENZ[ES,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,
vs

Case No 030106629

HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison
Judge PAT B BRIAN
Respondent

The above post conviction case came before the Court for hearing on Ralph Leroy
Menzies' (Petitioner) (I) motion to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for appeal, (2) motion to
order payment of Brass deposition transcript bill, (3) motion to require government to pay for
transcripts, printing and costs for appeal and (4) cross motions to extend time for filing notice of
appeal
At the hearing, the Court granted the parties cross motions to extend time for filing notice
of appeal and the Court took the remaining three motions under advisement The Court
considered the parties oral arguments and reviewed the parties briefs, applicable constitutional,
statutory, case law and rules and now renders the following decision on the remaining three
motions

BACKGROUND
This case has a long protracted history, which the Court does not provide here
Following is a very brief history of the case On March 8, 1988, Petitioner was found guilty of
first degree murder, a capital offense, and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in the
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death of Maunne Hunsaker Petitioner directly appealed the merits of his conviction The Utah
Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction
On April 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post
Conviction Relief On December 7, 2002, the Court granted Respondent's motion for summary
judgment on Petitioner's petition On January 11, 2002, the Court dismissed Petitioner's petition
for post conviction relief
Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment On February 26, 2004, the
Court denied Petitioner's motion to set aside
I
MOTION TO APPOINT RULE 8 QUALIFIED COUNSEL FOR APPEAL
Petitioner now seeks to have Rule 8 qualified counsel appointed for appeal relating to his
post conviction petition Petitioner argues that he has a right to appeal this Court's denial of the
motion to set aside summary judgment Citing Utah Constitution, Article 1 § 11 and 12, Article 8
§ 5, Utah Code §§ 77-I-6(I)(g), 77-l8a-l(b), and 78-35a-110, Utah R Civ P 65C(o) and 60(b)
Petitioner claims that the Utah Code contemplates that Rule 8 qualified counsel will be appointed
to represent indigent capital defendants in post-conviction cases, and will be paid by the Division
of Finance Citing Utah Code § 78-35a-202, UtahR Cam P 8 Furthermore, Petitioner argues
that the Utah Administrative Code governing capital post-conviction cases contemplates that
post-conviction counsel will continue to provide "all reasonable and necessary post-conviction
legal service" and will be paid to complete an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court Citing Utah
Adm Code §§ 25-14-3(1), see also 25-14-2, 25-14-4(5) Petitioner claims that the Court's
failure to appoint counsel to pursue his right to appeal would violate his due process rights
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Petitioner argues that given the complexity of capital post-conviction litigation, it would be
unfair to expect Petitioner, an indigent death row inmate with no law library, to represent
himself Petitioner argues that it is in society's best interest to appoint counsel because of the
unique and unalterable nature of the death penalty Moreover, Petitioner argues that there is no
substantial prejudice or injustice that will befall the Respondent by granting Petitioner a fair
opportunity to exercise his rights through counsel on appeal
It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel for his trial and m
Utah, pursuant to statute for direct appeals of his conviction of certain crimes See Utah Code §
77-32-301 et seq , but see Douglas v California, ill U S 353 (1963) However, that is not the
case before the Court Here, Petitioner launched a collateral attack of his conviction by filing his
post conviction petition, a civil matter
The issue, therefore, is whether Petitioner is entitled to appointment of Rule 8 qualified
counsel for his post conviction appeal
Upon review of federal and state law, the Court concludes that a constitutional right to
counsel does not extend to a post conviction petition appeal, which is a civil matter
Pennsylvania v Finley 481 U S 551,555 (1987) citing Johnson v Avery, 393 U S 483 (1969),
Wainwright v Torna, 455 U S 586 (1982), Ross v Moffitt, 417 U S 600 (1974), see also Treffv
Hinckley, 16 P 3d 212 (Utah 2001), Walker v Carlson, 740 P 2d 1372 (Utah App Ct 1987)
Although there is no constitutional right to counsel for post conviction petition appeal,
the Utah state legislature has enacted the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code §§ 78-35a101 et seq (the Act) providing appointment of counsel for post conviction proceedings
Here, the State does not oppose Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel based
-3-

upon law of the case. This Court previously appointed Petitioner's counsel and found her to be
Rule 8 qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases The Court also
previously and still finds Petitioner to be indigent
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel
for appeal.
II
MOTION TO ORDER PAYMENT
OF BRASS DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT BILL and
MOTION TO REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO PAY
FOR TRANSCRIPTS, PRINTING AND COSTS
The two remaining motions raise the same issue of whether Petitioner is entitled to
payment of transcripts, printing and other costs associated with his post conviction appeal.
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to payment of transcripts, printing and other costs
associated with his post conviction appeal pursuant to the Act, § 78-35a-202; Rule 8; Utah Code
§§ 25-14-2; 25-14-4(5). Petitioner argues that for his counsel to be effective she must present his
case using the record, which includes transcripts and other costs. Since Petitioner is indigent, he
cannot bear this expense and counsel should not have to either. Petitioner argues that the
legislature has provided that the Division of Finance should pay for these expenses.
The Division of Finance (the Division) filed a response to Petitioner's motions. The
Division argues that although the Division is the entity charged by statute to pay the costs of
counsel for indigent defendants pursuing post conviction remedies pursuant to the Act, the
Division has already provided Petitioner the payments to which he is entitled. Utah
Administrative Procedures Act R25-14-3 provides that "[a]ll appointed counsel agree to accept as
full compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts
-4-
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provided m the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4 " (The
schedule ) The Division argues that the only additional payments provided by the Rule are for
"reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000 in any one case for court
approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants " Utah Adm R 25-14-5 The
Division argues that it interprets its rule as plainly written that payment made under the schedule
is to cover the legal service performed and litigation costs incurred The Division argues that the
Petitioner has received all payments under the schedule for which he has qualified and these
payments are to cover reasonable litigation expenses, e g , transcripts, printing, filing fees etc
Section 78-35a-202 provides
(2)(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall
determine whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record
regarding the defendant's indigency If the court finds that the defendant is
indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation
expenses incurred m providing the representation provided for in this section shall
be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance
The statute specifically provides that "costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation
expenses

shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance

" The Division's

rules are a promulgation of the statute The rule fails to separate "costs of counsel" from "other
reasonable litigation expenses " The rule is too narrowly written to represent the statute The
statute separates expenses for "costs of counsel" from "other reasonable litigation expenses" and
so does the Court Post conviction attorney's are already rare and the attorney's fees are not
enough to cover expenses for transcripts, printing and other costs associated with post conviction
appeals Post conviction appeals clearly requires transcripts, printing and other expenses,
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therefore, there is no dispute that those are "reasonable expenses11 incurred in providing
Petitioner's representation. However, from oral arguments, it is apparent that there is dispute
regarding how many transcripts are necessary to perform Petitioner's post conviction appeal
The Court is not here to step in the shoes of Petitioner's counsel. Petitioner's counsel knows the
limited amount available for post conviction litigation under the Division's rules, therefore, she
may choose to use that money on post conviction appeal expenses as she deems necessary to
perform her duty as counsel.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to order payment of Brass
deposition transcript bill and motion to require government to pay for transcripts, printing and
costs for appeal

ORDER
The Court ORDERS;
Petitioner to submit an Order for Appointment of Counsel;
Petitioner to submit an Order to Pay for Transcripts, Printing and Costs.
The above Orders should be filed, after stipulation by the State, ^ f l M ^ t e t ^ j i g n .

DATED this^/dayof

flL^AJS

. 2004.^
By the Court; V; %

PAT B. B R I A N S
^ ^ . - j ,
Third District C o u r t ^ i ^ j i ^ > # #
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i ^ U *_

ELIZABETH HUNT (#5292)
Attorney for Mr Menzies
PO Box 9419

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109-0419
Telephone (801)706-1114
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner,
v.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison
Warden

ORDERS TO APPOINT COUNSEL
AND FOR STATE TO
PAY FOR TRANSCRIPTS
AND COSTS OF APPEAL
Case No 030106629
JUDGE BRIAN

Respondent.

Whereas, this matter came on for hearing before this Court on March 25, 2004,
upon the Petitioner's motion to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for the appeal from this
Court's February 26, 2004 order denying relief from the summary judgment, and upon
Petitioner's motions to require the State to pay for the transcript of the January 13, 2004,
deposition of Edward K. Brass and for the transcripts, printing and other costs on appeal
The Court has fully considered the motions and memoranda and arguments of the
parties.
Based upon the Motions of Petitioner, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.

I Elizabeth Hunt is found to be Rule 8 qualified to represent Menzies in his
appeal from this Court's February 26, 2004 order denying relief from summary judgment,
and is hereby appointed to complete the appeal.
2. The State of Utah, Division of Finance, is hereby ordered to pay the CitiCourt
bill for the January 24, 2004, deposition of Edward K. Brass.
3. The State of Utah, Division of Finance, is hereby ordered to pay for transcripts,
printing and other costs of appeal as deemed necessary by c^pMH^r^p^wner
Dated this

M

-X?\

•

»

^

day of

THE HONORJfcptE;
JUDGE OF T H ^ f y ^ ^

Approved as to form:
ssistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e-mailed and
mailed to:
Joel Ferre
Heber Weils Building
160 East 300 South
Box 140857
Salt Lake UT 84114-0857
and to:
Ralph Menzies

003328

Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
this April 23, 2004
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